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Hereafter, in this brief, the parties will be referrer!
to as in the Court below.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN
LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Honorable A. H. Ellett, judge, sitting without a jury. The Comt denied the relief sought by plaintiffs, rlismissecl !Jlaii:tiffs' complaint with prejudice, dismissed the ems~
claims against the Third Party defendants with
prejudice, and quieted title of the defendants against
the claims of the plaintiffs to the property described
in the defendants counterclaim and permanently
restrained plaintiffs from interference with the sairl
property.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek the affirmance of the judgment of the Court below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants find the Statement of Facts as set
forth in the Plaintiffs' brief, argumentative rather
than an orderly presentation of proYe<l or admitted
facts. For this reason defendants elect to make their
own statement of facts.
Defendants acquired from Leslie C. Gold and
Floris C. Gold, his wife, by warranty deed elated
September 12, 1960 the following describN1 pro·
perty:
The upper or north half of Lot 81, and the
lower or southerly half of the lower or south2

el'ly lialf of Lot 33, Block 2, Killyon Subdi1·isio11, Emigration Canyon, Salt Lake County,
Utah. (R.11)

Gold and his wife had acquired the described
property from William F. Salt and Della Jo Salt,
his wife, by wananty deed elated the 8th day of
.June 1960. ( R. 11)
Salt ancl his wife in turn acquired the described
property by warranty deed from Clara M. Whipple
on the 29th day of May 1956. (R 12) In none
of these deeds was there any reference to any right
of way 01· easement to which the property was subjPct. ( R. 12)
The tract of land next adjoining that of defendants on the north is owned by the plaintiffs.
Plaintiff Zella Harries owns an undivided one-fourth
interest in the property, plaintiff Elmer J. Richins
owns an undivided one half interest as a joint tenant with his wife, Blanche Richins, who is also the
owner of the remaining interest in her own right.
(R-51 Ex P-2, P-3) The legal description of the
Jll'Operty owned by plaintiffs is,
The lower half of the upper half and the uphalf of the lower half of Lot 33, Block 2,
K1llyon Subdivision, Emigration Canyon, Salt
Lake County, Utah. (R-51 - Ex. P-2, P-3)
property now owned by plaintiffs was acquired
by Leo A. Jones from the Emigration Canyon Impi·m·ernent Company by deed dated July 10, 1912.
(R 8:3, P-7) Leo A. Jones remained the owner of
p~r

!hl'

3

the said tract until February 18th, 1952 when hr·
gave the property to his four daughters, Zella Fa;,
Harries, Blanche Evelyn Richins, Mary Maxint
Clark and Bonnie Joyce Graves. (R-50 Ex. P. 2l
In none of the deeds affecting conveyance of th~
Jones Title was there any mention 01· reservation of
the right of way or easement involved in this litigation. (R. 51 Ex. P. 2 & 3) John ·w. Whipple,
husband of Clara M. Whipple, acquired the a<ljoining tract of land also from Emigration Canyon Improvement Co. in 1912, and built a cabin on the
tract the year following. ( R. 83) Leo A. Jones was
married to the sister of John "\V. \~lhipple. (R-5G,
83, 97) The two families were on good terms and
neighborly with each other. (R. 94, 107) Up until
1918 the canyon property was reached by the Jones
and Whipple families respectively by taking the
street car or train up Emigration Canyon and then
walking to the property from the nearest stop.
( R-97, 99, 100) They crossed the creek to their respective properties over small footbridges, one of
which served the Whipple property and one of which
served the Jones property. ( R-100) The railroad
ceased to run in about 1918. (R-134) Mr. Whipple
acquired a car and he and his sons built a bridge
of railroad ties across the creek so that they could
drive from the road across the creek onto their property. (R-100) The details of the construction. of
the bridge and the location thereof with relatwn
to property lines are obscured by the passage of
4

;:nd tlw failing memories of the participants.
Jfr .J(J 11 es t1·stified that his small son helped bring
dmrn tht: railrnad ties used to build the bridge.
(R-84, 86 J l\hs. \Yhipple denied that Mr. Jones or
his sun participated. (R-100) One of the Whipple
chilclren, Mrs. Pettit, remembered the building of
the bnrlge as rather a family project with all of
rl!r 1mcles and nephews joining in. ( R-135) On one
point en,ryone was in agreement, that there was no
rliscussion of whose property the tie bridge was
Iocatecl on (R-121) and that it was built to serve
the Whipples who owned a car. (R-87, 93, 107, 113)
In fact Mrs. \Vhipple said that she never even
thought about the boundary at the time that the
bridge was built or thereafter. (R-114) Mr. Jones
admitted that he did not own a car when the bridge
was built but rode up the canyon with his brotherin-law, Mr. \Vhipple, for more than two years after
the bridge was built before he acquired a car. ( R-93,
114) and that there was never any issue over the
drireway or bridge (R-94) between Jones and
Whipple. As originally drawn the complaint set out
a c:laim on behalf of the plaintiffs based on an actual
ownership of part of the land involved in the driveway. ( R-2, P. V) This was abandoned at pre-trial,
howt-wr. (R-19) The original driveway was only
:he width of a railroad tie. (R-91, 103, 136) The
present driveway is at least, even by the estimate
uf M1·. Richins, the plaintiff, some 4 to 5 feet wider
than the orig-inal driveway. (R-157) The change in
niiic·

the driveway came about somewhere bet\\ et'll 19:3~
and 1937 and resulted from the fad that tht (·omit··
changed the main road up Emigration Canyon. (R56, 73, 87) At the time that the change was mad~
by the county, and the new culvert put owr the
stream, the north end, that is the end of the cuh'f'l't
adjacent to the property of the plaintiffs, was placed
in the same position as the old bridge (Jf railrnad
ties as is shown by a clump of birches which it was
admitted stood at the encl of the original tie bride:e
and still stands today at the encl of thl' cuhwt
placed by the county. (R-88, 137, 139, UO, 157, 158,
159) The additional width, therefon>, \ms gained
by encroaching further upon the property now owned by the defendants Struhs. (R-140) The changP in
the county mad up Emigration Canyon resulted in
the abolition of the parking area east of the creek
which had theretofore been used by the Jones family,
predecessors in interest to the plaintiffs. (R-160.
7 4, 75)
From time to time in the inte1Tening year,,
the Whipples had built up the earth fill across the
culvert. ( R-125) After Mr. Struhs acquired the
property, he rocked up the end of the culvert and
filled it in an additional 28 to 30 inches onto his
property. (R-149) From the edge of the culvert •. a~
it is now placed on the north side next to the plarntiffs, to the point at which Mr. Struhs placed the
fence which created the controversy is some 51 inches .
( R. 14 7) The length of a railroad tie, a fad nt
6
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\\'liirli tli1· lo\'.·vr Comt took judicial notice, is only

6 feet. ( l~-::o, F-U) Exhibit D-11 shows that from
the t>dge of thl'. l'.uh'ert to the edge of the traveled
:·urfae,• 1Jf the drinway which lies, according to the
smwy (Ex. D-11), enti1·ely on the land owned by
Struhs, is a distance of 48 inches or 4 feet. Thus,
Mr. Strnhs p!al'.ecl the fence 3 inches inside of his
11\in pr11perty line as established by the survey. (R117 & Ex. D-11) and the entire t1·avelled portion
rJf the rlriwway even uncle1· the testimony of Mr.
Junes lirs entire!~· on defendants' ground. (R-147,
Ex. D-11 l

In April, 1932, a landslide occurred which demolished the Leo Jones house. The landslide also
co111pletely filled the parking area used by Jones so
that parking of cars on the land owned by Jones
wac; rendered \'irutally impossible. ( R-60, 70, 106,
108, 12~, l:io, 115) This condition existed until
after Mr. Struhs bought the property. ( R-145) Some
time in the interwning years, afte1· the property
claimed by plaintiffs was gi\·en by Leo Jones to his
daughters, a cabin of sorts was reconstructed on
the Jn1ws' property. ( R-60, 71)
Richins, in·esent plaintiff and husband of
Blanche H ich ins, acquired no actual interest in this
propr.l'ly ill his own right until April, 1957. ( R-29,
Finding No. 4) It is freely admitted by Leo A.
Jones and h:v Mrs. \\'hippie, the respective owners
of thl' adjoinin.e: tral'ts now claimed by plaintiffs
:'riil rid'1·nda11ts l'l'SlH'cti\·eI~·. that there was never
7

any question i·aisecl of the location of tht, li11unclan
line between their respectin' in·operfo,:--; or uf 111'1•
use of the drfreway during their i·espt'ctin, owim.
ships. (R-94, 107, 114) Mrs. \Yhippk· inc1i<"ated that
she thought that the bouncla1·y line \Yas marked bi·
an iron stake which stood in the ground for man~· ,
years immediately to the north side of the old ti~
bridge over the c1·eek and which was still thf:'re fur
some years afte1· the new cuh'ert was pla<"Pd. (R·
101) Mrs. \Vhipple indicated that she had nern·,
until the day of the trial, heard that the bounclan
line was marked by a tree next to the comer of
the \Vhipple home. ( R-103) From J 9;)2, when the
landslide occurred and the Jones' house was clt:struyed, until 1961 or 1962 the1·e was new1· any clear-tut
evidence of use of the driveway by the plaintiff
Richins or his wife and no claim was e\·er asserted
or testimony offered of any use by plaintiff Zella
Harries. The plaintiff claimed to have maue an
occasional use after the landslide but no effort was
made to prove the extent thereof. ( R-70, 71)
1

\Vhen Struhs began to use his house the year
round and desired to fence his land was the first
occasion that it became manifest and clear that
anyone on the plaintiffs' side claimed the right to
use the driveway other than pe1·missively. (R-148)
There had been one or two incidents immediately
prior to this time when Richins had requested Struhs
to remove his car parked in the driveway, but these
incidents were very shortly prior to putting up the
8

fr•Jl('t' 1H-(iO, fi 1) an cl occurred after Sti·uhs bought
the vrnpel't>'- Defendants, in the interest of neighborlin1-·ss ~mc1 good will, despite the contention that
the plaintiffs had no right whatever to use the clrive\raY made a formal offer th1·ough the court to put
a r~1,l\'el't across the creek and put in a clriYeway at
defendants' expense on plaintiffs' land so that Richins could reach his property from the road without
tn11 ersing ~m:v portion of the defendants' land. ( R19, 20) This offer was rejected by Richins as is
shown by thr record. ( R-28)

ARGUMENT
POI:\T I.

TIIE DHI\'E\V AY, WHICH PLAINTIFFS CONTHEY HAVE A RIGHT TO USE, WAS NOT A
.JOI.NT OR COMMON DRI\"EWAY INTENTIONALLY
LAID OUT AND CONSTRUCTED ON PROPERTY
0\\'.\'ED BY THE PREDECESSORS OF PLAINTIFFS
AND DEFENDANTS, BUT WAS BUILT ON THE PROPERTY OF THE DEFENDANTS' PREDECESSOR IN
TITLE, \\'llIPI'LE, FOR HIS O\YN USE AND AS IT
:STANDS TODAY IN\"OL\"ES ~O PROPERTY OF THE
PLAINTIFFS . .JOINT DRI\"EWAY CASES ARE NOT
APPLICABLE PRF:CEDENT UNDER THE FACTS OF
TE~D

THIS CASE.

The plaintiffs sought originally in the commencrment of this action to base their claim of
tight to utilize the driYeway in question on the
theory of the const1·uction of a joint, common driveway utilizing property donated by plaintiffs' and
'.lefenclants' predecessors in title respectively, utilizmg a11 t·qual portion of the prnperty of each. (R-2.
9

P. III) This claim was abandoned at thr pre-tl'ial
and the plaintiffs chose to rely solely upon a clain 1
of a prescripti,-e right acquired by aclnrse possession or adverse use. ( R-19) Plaintiffs nevertheless
persisted throughout the trial, in the argument b~
fore the lower Court and in the presentation to
this Court, place emphasis on the purported l'.ontribution by plaintiffs to the creation of the driveway.
The trial court permitted introduction of such cYidence and the record is replete with the efforts
by the plaintiffs to establish the fact that the boundary line between the respective properties lay somewhere in the driveway. Mr. Richins, whose testimony was characterized throughout the trial by an
amazing lack of candor and frankness, attem1Jtecl
to claim that the boundary line lay in the rnicldl~
of the driveway. (R-157) Mr. Richins, likewise,
attempted to claim that there was a clearly demarked boundary by trees which was recognized
by both parties. ( R-67, 68) This was denied by Mrs.
Whipple and by all of the witnesses of the defendant. (R-103, 119, 120, 128, 129, 142) The effort by
Richins to lift himself by his own boot straps in
attempting to establish a recognized and established
boundary line between the respective properties favorable to his contention is reminiscent of the situation depicted in the musical comedy "Guys an(I
Dolls" where Big Julie, a gambler from Chicago.
suffering serious losses, compelled the otht:>r garnhlers to play a round with his dice from which he
10

ltacl J't:JJ1(1\ ed the spots but remembe1·ed where they
nsr:d to lw. Mr. l(ichins, without the benefit of any
other than his 1JWn testimony not even supported
by his father-in-law, Mr. Jones, tried to establish
u;1ilatcrally, a bounclal'y line between these properties. He dcridecl the sm-Yey 'vhich the defendants
had c:n1scd to hr made, Exhibit D-11, (R-63) but
rhong·h tht' plaintiffs had the bunlen of proof to
sustain tl1is point, pl'Oduced no tangible evidence
of the lr1cation of the boundary. Plaintiffs relied
solely on the testimony of Richins himself whose
bias is manifest from the mere i·eading of the Transcript of Testimony.
Pnclr:· the pl'Oof offered in the instant case,
the plaintiffs cannot sustain a right based upon
ownel'ship of any portion of the driveway, for as
it is presently placed, the traveled surface of the
drireway is at least 2 feet south of the point at
which Leu A . .Jones testified he believed the boundary line to be at the time the original tie bridge
was eonstructecl. ( R-91, 138, 157, 158) Even Mr.
Richins admitted that the clump of birches standing at the north encl of the bridge 01· culvert was
there in the same relative position at the time that
the tie bridgi.· existed. (R-157, 158) This being
true, and it being shown that the north end of the
culrert is now 51 inches north of the disputed fence
I'
ilne, and -18 inches north of the traveled surface of
d11 ' clrireway, there can be no claim made that the
Y•·::e·11t drin'\\'ay, e\ren nndei· the most favorable
11

view of the plaintiffs' evidence, is upon lancl uwnecl
by the plaintiffs. Mr. Richins, while adn1itting tht
extension of the width of the bridge arnl of the
driveway, refused to admit that the boundal'y line
did not move as the driveway was extended. His
testimony on this point was evasive in the extrel!l~.
He placed the boundary line, conveniently in the
middle of the d1·iveway (R-157) though Ml'. Jones.
owner at the time the tie bridge was built and plain·
tiffs' predecessor in title, admitted that no rnm·p
than one third of the land in the original driveway
was his at any time and prnbably not mul'e than
two feet. (R-91) Mr. Richins, while admitting that
the driveway had increased in width some four to
five feet, ( R-157) and admitting that the encl of
the culvert placed by the county to replace the tie
bridge, was, in so far as its position on his side
in the same place as the tie bridge by referral to
the clump of birch which remained constant in its
position throughout the period, (R-157, 158) hP
nevertheless claimed that the boundary line still
lay in the middle of the widened driveway. (-157)
This is, of course, a mechanical impossibility.
Mr. Richins lack of truthfulness in his testimony is well illustrated in his exchange with the
Judge regarding the number of cars which could
be parked on his side of the driveway.
"Q. The area that would be west of the
creek, how many cars could _YOU pal'k on Y~~
area that is north of the driveway and we,
of the stream?
12

\Vell, if you want to ask that questell you quite a few.
Q. THE COURT: He's already asked
the question. Just answer it.
A. Twenty-five, but you can say it is
wrong, see. It all depends.
THE COURT: \Vell, if you want me to
say it is wrnng, just-.
A. You can put ten.
THE COURT: I want you to answer his
question, and I want you to answer it truthfully. I don't care what he says about it. I
want you to tell me the truth. If you don't
intend to tell me the truth, get off the stand.
No nerd of my listening to you if it is not
true.
tion,

A.

r could

A. I never did measure.
MR. BLACK: I wonder if counsel would
clarify the question.
THE COURT: It is clear enough. He just
asked how many cars could he park on their
property west of the stream. He says he could
tell us twenty-five, but he wouldn't believe it.
I don't like that kind of answer. It is taking
my time fo1· nothing.
A. \Vell, I will say you can put twelve
cal'S in there if you pa1·kec1 them right.
Q. Sir, now, this is in 1932 before the
change of the road?
MR. BLACK: No, I believe A. You had it the other way.
MR. BLACK: I believe that that question
was grared to after the culvert was 1 "0

THE COURT: Let the witness tell wh;it
the facts are. I thought it was befort> the roar!
was changed when you were parking but if
it isn't '
MR. BLACK: Well, he said THE COURT: Let's find out both wavs.
The1·e are no secrets. How many cars coiilrl
you park on your lot, the one you now own,
west of the stream before the mad was ehang-ed?
A. Before the road was changed?
THE COURT: Yes.
A. \Vell, I wouldn't estimate H.
MR. BLACK: Well give us an estimate.
A. Well, I would say 'four.
THE COURT: Four?
A. And I could say ten.
MR. BLACK: Well give us your best THE COURT: You don't need to bother
him. Go ahead Mr. Tibbals." (R-31, 32)
Mr. Jones, the owne1· of the land now claimed
by plaintiffs at the time that the original tie bridge
was put in across the c1·eek, made no claim that he
had participated in the creation of the bridge or
the driveway, and made no claim that the same hall
been intentionally laid out by the adjoining owners
to utilize portions of their respective properties in
the driveway. (R-87, 91) Mr. Jones only claim to
any participation in the original creation of the
bridge was that his son, who was then about eight
years of age, (R. 143) helped Mr. ·Whipple. de14

£e 11 dant's prccleeessor in title bring down some of
the ties that were used in making the bridge. (R91, 86)

This is a fa1· cry from the situation which is
recognized as creating a common right of way or
driveway to which neither party may deny access
to the other. Corpus Jm·is Secundum Vol. 28 on
EASEMENTS at page 673 Sec. 18j as quoted by
;ippellants' brief outlines the conditions essential to
the creation of this kind of an easement or right
11f way as follO\vs:
"The mutual use by adjoining landowners of
a way laid out between their lands, each devoting a part of his land to the purpose, will
generally be considered adverse to a separate
and exclusive use of the way be either owner.
As stated in Corpus Juris, which has been
cited and quoted with approval, while there
are some decisions to the contrary, the weight
of authority is to the effect that, where adjoining proprietors lay out a way or alley
between their lands, each devoting a part of
~1is land to that purpose, and the way or alley
is us~cl for the p1·escriptive period by the respective owners or their successors in title,
~1either can obsb'uct or close the part which
is on his own land; and in these circumstances
the mutual use of the whole of the way or
alley will be considered adverse to a separate
and exclusive use by either party."
Appellants' problem is that the facts in this case
do not support the application of this doctrine as
to the eaRe before the court. Plaintiff's predecessor
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in title, Jones, made no claim that hr had particip- '
ated in the laying out of the driveway. He admitted
he had no car at the time it was established or for 1
at least 2 years thereafter. He admitted that Whip- ,
ple did the work. He claimed his eight year old 1
son had helped carry some of the railroad ties but
no proof was offered by plaintiffs that Jones and
Whipple ever mutually laid out the driveway as a
joint driveway.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM TO A PRESCRIPTIVE
RIGHT TO USE THE DRIVEWAY IN QUESTION IMPOSES UPON PLAINTIFFS THE BURDEN OF PROOF
OF SUCH RIGHT. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SUSTAIN
THIS BURDEN. DEFENDANTS' TITLE TO THE AREA
IN QUESTION WAS THEREFORE RIGHTFULLY
QUIETED BY THE COURT BELOW AS AGAINST THE
CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS.

Plaintiffs presentation of this case on appeal
is based on the assumption that the defendants have
the burden of showing that the plaintiffs did not
acquire a prescriptive right to the use of the driveway in question. (Appellants Brief p. 10) In so
arguing, plaintiffs have lost sight of the fact that
the burden in the first instance is theirs. This Court
has spoken clearly and unequivocally on this point:
"Furthermore, since the clefend ants . cl~illl
the right to use the driveway by prescnption.
they have the burden of establishing such
claim bv clea1· and convincing evidence . .Jeni
sen v. VGerrard, Supra; 2 Tiffany on Rea
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Prop(·rty 2d Ed. Sec. 519. P. 2046." Buckley
\·. Cox 122 LT. 151 247 P2d 277.
ln aid of their position, the plaintiffs have relied on a presumption of adverse use to show that
their usr of the dri\·eway in question by themselves
and their predecessorn in interest was hostile and
adverse to the defendants. It was shown that the
Llriyeway had been used by plaintiffs and their
predecessors in title fo1· more than the prescriptive
period of twenty years recognized in this state as
essential to establishment of a prescriptive right.
Plaintiffs attempt to rely on the theory of joint
driveway as a means of creating a presumption of adverse use in plaintiffs' favor fails for the
reasons argued in Point No. I of this brief. There
simply was never creation of a joint driveway.
There is not one word of dispute in the record but
that defendants' predecessor in title John Whipple
created the driveway in question for his own use.
The mere fact that the eight yea1· old son of the
brother-in-law of Whipple, Jones, helped his uncle
when his uncle built the tie bridge by carrying ties,
does not make this a joint or common driveway.
Plaintiffs' reliance on a presumption of adversity
is mistaken unde1· the facts of this case.
The law in the State of Utah is clear and unambiguous on the matter of what is required to
e~tablish a claim of prescriptive right to use of a
nght of way. The position of this Court has been
17

consistent down through the yeal'S as is shown br
the following cases.
·
The case of Harkness v. vVoodmcurnee, 7 Utah
229, 26 P. 292 states,
"The right to a public road or in·i\'atl:
way by prescription arises from the uninterrupted adverse enjoyment of it under a claim
of right known to the owner for the requisite
length of time. Anciently the i·ight to the easement arose by prescription from the use nf
the land for so long a time that there was no
existing evidence as to when such use commenced. Its origin must have been at a time
'whereof the memory of man runneth not to
the contrary.' Later the rule was changed by
limiting the time of uninterrupted possession
to 20 years."
This rule was cited favorably and enlarged upon
and interpreted in the case of Morris v. Blwd, 40
Utah 243, 161 P. 1127. This case held,
"Under the well-established rule, the use,
in order that it may ripen into a prescriptive
title, must, in any case, not only be adverse
and continuous, and under claim of right for
a period of twenty years, but it must be uninterrupted throughout that period. . · ·"
In the case of Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481,
39 P.2d 1070, the court there stated, quoting from
page 1072 of the Pacific Report,
"Since the defendants claimed the right
to use the roadway by prescription, the b_urrl~1:.
was upon them to establish such claim 1.
clear and satisfactory evidence. 2 Tiffany i;n
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Heal Propertv ( 2cl Ed.) Sec. 519, p. 2046;
10 C.J. 958, Sec. 181; 1 Jones' Comm. on Evid.
522. Before a right of way can be acquired
by prescription, the use for th~ prescriptive
period must be peaceable, contmuous, open,
adverse as of right, and with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the plaintiff and his
grantors and predecessors in interest. Actual
notice to the owner of the servient estate is
not necessary if the user is so notorious that
in the exercise of reasonable diligence the
owne1· should learn thereof; then he will have
constructive notice of the user which is sufficient. Dahl v. Roach, 76 Utah, 74, 287 P. 622;
Bolton \'. Murphy, 41 Utah, 591, 127 P. 355;
Crosier \·. Brown, 66 W. Va. 273, 66 S.E.
326, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 174; Gardner v.
Swann, 114 Ga. 304, 40 S.E. 271; Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 P.
843, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 941; Watson v. Board
of County Commissioners, 38 Wash. 662, 80
P. 201 ; 2 Tiffany on Real Property ( 2d Ed.)
Sec. 521.
"A twenty-year use alone of a way is
not sufficient to establish an easement. Here
u.;e of a roadway opened by a landowner for
Ins Oll'n 1mrpose will be presumed permissive.
An antagonistic or adverse use of a way cann.ot sprin .r; from a permissive use. A prescriptive title must be acquired adversely. It cannot be adverse 1chen it rests upon a license
or m~1·e neighborly accommodation. Adverse
user is the antithesis of permissive user. If
the use is accompanied by any recognition in
express terms or by implication of a right in
t~e Ia:idowner to stop such use now or at some
b~11e m the future, the use is not adverse. 2
Tiffany, supra, Sec. 519; Horne v. Hopper,
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72 Colo. 434, 211 P. 665; Eddy v. Delllichelis
100 Cal. App. 517, 280 P. :~89." (Emphasi~
ours)
The case of Sdrales v. Rondos, 116 Utah 288,
209 P2d 562 involves some prnperty on \Vest Tl'mp!e
in Salt Lake City and an alleyway running behind
the one tract upon which the owner of the next
adjoining tract claimed a right by prescription. Th~
question which was of significance in that case was
the means of application of the rules and presumption relative to when a use is hostile or pennissiw.
The court said,
"[2] The defendant contends that ht
has shown an open and continuous use of the
alleyway by himself and his predecessors in
title for over twenty years and that under the
rule laid down by this court in Zollinger v.
Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P. 2d 714, 716,
170 A.L.R., the use is presumed to be against
the owner of the servient estate. True, in that
case we said 'we think the better rule is that
* * * where a claimant has shown an open and
continuous use of the land for the prescriptive period (20 years in Utah) the use will be
presumed to have been against the owner and
the owner of the servient estate to prevent the
prescriptive easement from arising has t.hc
burden of showing that the use was under h1!1 1
instead of against him.' However, t~e _fart~ ll1
Zollinger v. Frank are entirely <l1strnguishable from the facts in the present case. In tlw
Zollinger case the servient owner did not opel
the right of way for his own use and he usec
only a portion of it infrequently. ~ecause ~~
these facts we distinguished the Zolhngrr ca~t
20

from Harkness \·. ·woodmansee, 7 Utah 227,
26 P. :Z~Jl. 29:~, wherein we said, 'Where a
person opens a way for the use ~f his ow!1 premises, and another person uses it also without
causing damage, the presumption is, in the
absence of e\·iclence to the contrary, that such
use bv the latter was permissive, and not
under. a claim of right.' This rule was reaffirmPd in Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481,
:39 P.2c1 1070. See the cases cited in support
of the rule in 170 A.L.R. 825."
In the case of Burkley 'V. Cox, supra, the plaintiff as the owner of a home in Provo, Utah had a
clrireway on the north 12 feet of the property. The
driveway was used as a means of ingress and egress
to and from the rear of plaintiffs' property. The
driveway had been constructed by Plaintiff's father
some fifty years prior to the commencement of the
action. No trouble existed between plaintiff and defendant until app1·oximately three years prior to
the commencement of the action. During this period
rlefendant's son acquired an automobile and persisted in parking it on the driveway in question. Defendant contended that the driveway was appurtenant to his prnperty; that his property line extended to the middle line of the driveway making a
joint right of way. He further contended adverse
use for more than twenty years. Under survey the
description in defendant's deed revealed that his
property line constituted the northern boundary of
the driveway and did not extend to the middle of
the clri\•eway.
:! 1

(Note: \Ve direct the court's attention to the
fact that this is also true in the instant case. While
the survey showed that the entire subdivision was
laid out incorrectly from the starting point,
the section corner as now established, if the suney
was made from the stake used as the starting point
originally, in setting the lines on the lots in question,
the improvements are properly located, the county
road is properly placed, and the travelled area of
the driveway is on the defendant's property. (Ex.
D-11)) It further shows that even originally when
the tie bridge was built the boundary could not
have been in the middle of the driveway.) (E:;,
D-11)
This Court, in the Buckley case, while admitting that there was a conflict in the evidence pointed out,
"A presil1nption well established in this state
is that where a person opens a way for the
use of his own preniises, and another pel'son
also uses it without causing domage, in thf
absence of evidence to the contrary, such use
by the latter is permissive, and not under ci
claim, of l'i,qht. Jensen v. Gerrard, supra; Sa~
age v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197 P2d 111;
Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Cache County
Poultry Growers Ass'n.. Utah 209 P2rl:
Sdrales v. Rondos, Utah, 209 P2d 562. It wa~
defendant's burden to overcome this presumption and to establish this claim by clear and
convincing evidence.Jen sen\'. Gerrard, supra.
This, in the judgment of the lower coul't h'
failed to do." (Emphasis ours)
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The factual situation in the case of Lunt v.
[{itche17s, 12:3 Utah 488, 260 P.2d 535 is close to
the factual situation in the case before the court.
l\'eidners opened a driveway upon their own property next adjoining the land owned by the Kitchens.
The vVeidners and the Kitchens, as adjoining neighbors, lived in harmony and there were never any
objectioHs raised to the use of the driveway on the
Weiciner's property by the Kitchens for delivery of
coal and \Voocl, fo1· access to parking of their cars
and for foot passage. The W eidners sold to the
Lunts. The Lunts objected to the use of the right
of way by the Kitchens and shut it off. The law
suit resulterl. In consideration of this case, the Supreme Court said,
"However, it is obvious that where a
special relationship such as a license exists,
the owner of the land is entitled to more notice than the mere use of his land not inconsistent with the license. Thus it is said in the
Restatement of Property Sec. 458j;
.
'vVhere a user of land and one having an
m~erest affected by the use have a relationship to each other sufficient in itself to justify
the use, the use is not adverse unless knowledge of its adverse character is had by the
o~~ whose interest is affected. The responsi~1lity of bringing this knowledge to him lies
m the one making the use.'
" [ 5] In other words, the presumption
of ~d\'ersity will not arise under mere use by
a licensee and knowledge of such use on the
part of the licensor. Yeager v. Woodruff, 17
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Utah 361, 53 P. 1045. The 11sc m111wt be ,,dverse 1chen it rests upon license 01· mere 11cig/
borly acc01n11wdation. Jensen v. Gerrarcl,·8.)
Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070. Sclrales v. Rondos
116 Utah 288, 209 P.2d 562."
'
* * *
"The fact that, as witness for the respondents testified, the driveway was used 'constantly as ours [the Kitchenses]' is also insufficient to give notice to a licensor of an ac!verse claim. The tearing down of a gate rrected by the Weidner's tenant, of course, would
give actual notice of a claim of right, but this
act did not occur until 1946."
1•

*

* *
"Where the use begins as permissive, as
it does here under the presumption of Harkness v. Woodmansee, supra, it is incumbent
upon the party asserting that it has afterward
become adverse to show at what point this occurred in order to show a twenty-year hostile period. "We are not justified in conjecturing as to when or if such a hostile period
began.' Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197
P.2d 117, 124." (Emphasis ours)
The recent case of Harriet Rippent'l'op v. Pickering in 1962, 15 U. 259, 387 P.2d 95, again recognizes the fact that neighborly accommodation between kinfolk cannot become the basis of an adnrs~
claim and the court stated,
"For over half century the drive aweared to have been used by adjoining owi:ers, ~II
of whom claimed title to their respective P10;
perties through a common grantor, and al1 °·
whom, and their predecessors in ti tie, belong24

erl to the same family, until 1959, when the
north tract was sold to plaintiff, wh? broug~t
this action. Before that date, there is no evidence of anything but a cordial family use of
the drive, as ordinarily W?uld be the case
with kinfolk. Any presumpt10n as to adverse
user for mm·e than 20 years seems clearly to
have been dispelled by evidence of permissive,
neighborly use.
"The metes and bounds descriptions reflerted in the abstracts of title were not detroyed by procedure or proof in this case, but
on the contrary the record supports the trial
court's conclusion that any use of the subject
drive, looking at the record favorably to appellant, was not adverse and consequently defendant's record title remained inviolate. We
think that after review thereof, we are constrained to and do hold that our pronouncements in Lunt v. Kitchens and the authorities
therein cited, pertinently and significantly are
dispositive of this, a very similar case."
That the law as laid down by the Supreme Court
of Utah is also recognized as the law in other jurisdictions is shown by the annotation appearing at 27
ALR2d 332 on the subject, "Boundary Strip - Reciprocal Use". Many authorities are there cited in
support of the views expressed by this Court in the
cases above cited. Particular attention is directed
to the statement of the annotator found at page 354
of the mentioned annotation:
"If the driveway commenced simply in a use
by on_e ?f the adjoining owners, or at most is
not d1stmcly shown to have originated in con25

current acti?~ by adjoining owners, n1ii·
through prov1s10n made by anyone who at the
time owned both properties, the finding that
the user was not adverse may be well Sll]lported."
In the case of Rust v. Engledow, (Texas Ci\'.
App.) 368 SW2d 635, the court said:
'"Use of a right of way is permissive and not
adverse, as a matter of law, if the way is alsu
used by the owner of the land, along with
the other user."
We beUeve that the cases cited by defendants
Struhs in support of their position are pertinent
and controlling under the facts in this case. An analysis of the cases cited by the plaintiffs in their
brief discloses that almost without exception thesP
cases are clearly distinguishable on a factual basis.
They are cases wherein the adjoining property
owners either by actual agreement, or in fact mutually joined in the creation of a joint driveway.
each contributing land and work in the establishment of the driveway for their mutual or joint use.
For this reason, the cases cited by the plaintiffs are
not helpful in resolving the problems presented in
the instant case, since no such factual situation
was here proved.
POINT III.
THIS ACTION IS ONE AT LAW. TF THEl~E JS
ANY COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECOIW TO
SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDINGS THE JUDGJ\JE\T
OF THE LOWER COURT SHOULD BE SUSTAI~F.fl

This Court in the case of Buckley
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I',

Cox. U~

u.

J:'il ~47 P2d 277 was there confronted with a

wry similar case to the one n?w before the Court
as shown by the court's analysis of the facts:
"Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title
in the driveway in herself and to enjoin the
defendants from further use of such driveway Defendant contended that the driveway
was appurtenant to his property and that the
property line extended to the middle of the
driveway making it a joint right of way. He
further contends that by open, adverse, and
hostile use under a claim of right for over a
period of twenty years he had acquired a
right by prescription over the strip of land
in question." 247 P2d at page 278.
The Court, after summarizing the facts as
above quoted, then said,
"Under the criteria set out in Norback v.
Board of Directors 84 U. 506, 37 P2d 339,
this action is one at law. Hence, if there is
any competent evidence in the record to support the Court's findings the judgment should
not be disturbed. Brown v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
76 U. 475, 290 P. 759; Jenkins v. Stephens,
64 U. 307, 231 P. 112. This principle is well
stated in Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 U. 841, 39
P2d, 1070, 1072:
'As this is a law action, the question is
not whether the evidence would have supported the decision in favor of the appellants, but whether the decision made by
the trial court finds support in the evidence. If there is competent credible evidence to support the findings made by
the trial court, then those findings should
stand.
* * *
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"The evidence as revealed by the l'ecord is
conflicting. It is sufficient to support a de<:ision for either party. The trial judge saw and
heard all the witnesses and viewrd the exhibits. He found that the use by the defenclam
was permissive and not adverse. Since competent evidence in the record supports the court's
findings and judgment we may not distmb
the latter." (at page 280 of 247 P2d.)
We believe this language particularly applicable to the case at bar. Here the trial court not only
heard the witnesses and examined the exhibits, bul
took sufficient interest to actually visit the scene
and examine the ground, and upon his retmn to
the bench stated:
"THE COURT : The record may show that I
did inspect the properties involved herein. I
paid particular attention to the culvert where
it now exists and to trees that are on either
side of the creek, both above and below the
culvert, and I have observed the trees that
are near the Struhs home. You may promd,
Mr. Black". (R-86)
After the careful consideration given by the
trial court to the facts, testimony and exhibits, the
trial court found that the use of the driveway in
question by plaintiffs and plaintiffs' predecessors in
interest was not adverse but a "cm·dial family use
of the drive as might be and is generally the case
between kinfolk and good neighbors and was neighborly accommodation." (R-32 Finding 27)
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There is adequate evidence in the record to
support thr court's findings and decree. Under the
doctrine approved by this Court in the case above
citPcl, the judgment in this case should not be disturbed.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Court below should be affirmed, and the defendants should be awarded their
costs here incurred.
Respectfully submitted,
JOE P. BOSONE and
ALLEN H. TIBBALS
Suite 604 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg.
315 East 2nd South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
Merle R. Struhs and Jackie Struhs.
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